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Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans: What Might a
Sociological Embeddedness Perspective Offer Disaster
Research and Planning?
Roberta Rehner Iversen∗
University of Pennsylvania
Annie Laurie Armstrong
Business Government Community Connections, Seattle,
Washington
The Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans situation was
commonly called a “natural disaster”—an anomalous
“event” that disrupted lives, spaces, and organizations.
Research and planning attention then focused on particular
aspects of the event and on restoring order. In contrast,
sociologists and similar-thinking scholars have increasingly
viewed disaster situations from multiple locations and
histories, often using systems theory. Here, reanalysis of
empirical material from ethnographic research in New
Orleans pre-and post-Katrina suggests that a sociological
embeddedness perspective illustrates the dynamic
seamlessness of past, present, and future economic contexts
and social actions. The perspective’s constitutive concepts
of weak, strong, and differentiated ties highlight the role of
local knowledge, intermediary-led workforce networks, and
sustained participatory planning in creating a robust
economic environment. Toward this end, disaster research,
planning, and theory building could incorporate network tie
assessments into social vulnerability protocols, compare
embeddedness with other perspectives, and learn from
related international experiences.
Scholars from numerous disciplines have contributed
notably to knowledge about disaster prevention, response,
and recovery, yet they and most of the general public
viewed Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans in August 2005
as a “natural disaster”—an anomalous “event” that

disrupted lives, spaces, organizations, and institutions. By
implication, these lives, spaces, organizations, and
institutions were functioning adequately before the act of
nature, thus the disruption only required interventions that
would facilitate recovery or reestablishment of the prior
state. In contrast, over the last couple of decades, disaster
sociologists, as well as scholars from psychology, political
science, anthropology, geography, and disaster research
centers, came to see disasters as multifaceted, which led
them to view the Hurricane Katrina—New Orleans
situation as a mix of “natural” and “human-made” or
“technological” causes and as a historically conditioned
process (Brunsma, Overfelt, & Picou, 2007; Colten, 2006;
Hartman & Squires, 2006; Oliver-Smith, 1996, 2006;
Perry, 2005; Perry & Quarantelli, 2005). As such, these
more complex theoretical perspectives on disaster were
often based on systems theory (Barber, 1995; Erikson,
2007; Ibata-Arens, Dierkes, & Zorn, 2006), which
commonly posited discrete human and institutional actors,
the goal of equilibrium or reestablishment of the status quo,
binary distinctions between micro and macro or humans
and nature, and at one extreme, a view in which “problems”
are “attacked” through “social engineering” and the
mentality of “expertism” (Montuori & Purser, 1996, p.
185). From a traditional systems perspective, little attention
was paid to local knowledge and participatory planning.
An additional limitation of viewing the Hurricane Katrina–
New Orleans situation exclusively from traditional systems
theory is that, epistemologically and practically, it
maintains the fiction that “events” and social actors are at
the same time bound together and yet independent of each
other—a view that is paralleled by the structure of
autonomous government departments and funding streams
that provide institutionally separate prevention, response, or
recovery efforts. For example, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) addresses temporary
housing concerns in New Orleans and the U.S. Department
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) addresses
longer-term concerns, but neither concern has been
addressed effectively (Cooper & Block, 2006), even 3 years
after Katrina. Similarly, other components of an economic
infrastructure, such as transportation, education and job
training, child care, and employment, functioned
autonomously in relation to the work efforts of many New
Orleans residents before Katrina, and although these vitally
related areas are essential to rebuilding the city economy,
they remain structured and perceived as separate spheres.
Arguably, contemporary system-based scholarship could
yield more-valuable knowledge about the Hurricane
Katrina–New Orleans situation, as it has emphasized the
notions of dynamic processes and webs of connected
relationships between the system parts that could even be
considered mutually constitutive (Montuori & Purser,
1996). Nevertheless, most disaster scholarship is based on
the more constricted and totalizing nature of earlier systems
concepts.
In this context, as we reanalyzed empirical material on lowincome families and economic mobility from longitudinal
ethnographic research we conducted in New Orleans before
and after Hurricane Katrina, the underlying systems
perspective that guided the original study (Iversen &
Armstrong, 2006) did not seem to fully explain the
embeddedness of New Orleans’s economic situation after
the storm and levee failures in the city’s economic
infrastructure over prior decades. Indeed, the possibility
that a sociological embeddedness perspective might
provide a particularly inclusive understanding of this
disaster situation emerged inductively from these analyses,
which we explore more fully in this article. As such, this
article adds a new dimension to the earlier ethnographic
findings and, in line with both Tierney’s (2007) and
Quarantelli’s (2005) plea for further theoretical
development in disaster research, hopes to open new
theoretical territory for disaster sociologists and other
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disaster scholars who find the new landscape compelling.
This theoretical direction also holds the promise/potential
of more adequate, relevant, and just problem viewpoints
and planning directions.
Briefly, an embeddedness perspective, with its theoretical
origins in economic sociology (Granovetter, 1985, 1992b,
2005; Polanyi, 2001/1944), posited economic action as
social action (Jagd, 2007). It explicitly contested the
neoclassical economics perspective which held that
economic action was motivated by individualistic selfinterest and utility maximization, and thus left little room
for solidarity, joint decision-making, or altruistic
motivation for action. In other words, from an
embeddedness perspective, economic, political, and
relational phenomena are constitutive of social/economic
action via networks of interpersonal and interorganizational
“ties,” which are, to greater or lesser extents, formed out of
trusted, reciprocal, and sustained relationships. Although
anthropological scholars have also valuably put forth a
perspective on embeddedness (Moody & White, 2003;
Oliver-Smith, 2006; Schweizer, 1997), the sociological
version is primary in this article for three reasons: it
emphasizes the importance of network ties, which emerged
as important in our research; the anthropological version
tends to retain a systems orientation, even as it speaks of
embeddedness; and anthropologists have taken the concept
outside of the Granovetterian emphasis on economic action,
which is this article’s focus. Accordingly, an embeddedness
perspective in this article refers to the sociological version,
which is amplified further in a later section.
Specifically, we explore embedded networks in this article
via their constitutive presence in the everyday phenomena
of education and job training, labor market opportunity, and
work policy supports, such as affordable child care and adequate transportation, and particularly via a new form of
community organization known as workforce
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intermediaries (Giloth, 2004), which by their very structure
and purpose, foster ties among human and organizational
actors in urban locales such as New Orleans. This
exploration seems increasingly necessary because disasters,
as sociologically conceptualized, are on the rise in the
United States and elsewhere due to increased development
of physically hazardous parts of coastal
or river-bank cities (Achenbach, 2008), the parallel
increase in population density in disaster-prone areas
(Picou & Marshall, 2007, p. 5), and politically influenced
decisions about building shortcuts in those areas (Johnson,
2008). For example, Revkin (2008) characterized the
outcome of the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar in terms similar
to those used for decades about New Orleans: “Deltas are
disaster zones in waiting” (p. 3). In the United States,
according to Dynes and Rodriguez (2007), “coastal
counties constitute about 17% of the landmass (excluding
Alaska), but 53% of the U.S. population (153 million
people) live in these areas” (p. 31). Moreover, unequally
distributed risks and results of disaster situations by
economic status have been well documented, both in the
United States and internationally, as Maruyama and
Ruscher’s (2006) special issue on Hurricane Katrina and
New Orleans in Analysis of Social issues and Public Policy
richly illustrated. Referring to Katrina and the South Asian
tsunami as exemplars, Beck (2006) contended that, locally
and globally, “catastrophic risk follows the poor” (p. 339),
a contention that Erikson (2006) expanded upon: “acute
disasters very often visit the homes of people who have
already been the victim of chronic disasters” (p. 11).
Although wealthier families in New Orleans were also
dislocated and deprived of homes and jobs, greater
resources resulted in greater protection and resilience for
most of them (Colten, 2006; Logan, 2006).
Thus, because a systems perspective on disaster situations
tends toward atomism rather than pluralism, and because
disaster situations seem to be increasingly prevalent, this
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article explores how a sociological embeddedness
perspective might enhance participatory disaster prevention
and mitigation and lead to more inclusive disaster and
infrastructure planning, as follows. First, theoretical
perspectives on disaster from multiple disciplines and from
sociology are examined for their difference from, but
possible movement toward, an embeddedness perspective.
The concept of embeddedness is then presented more fully,
particularly in relation to network ties, and a short section
on the empirical and spatial context of the ethnographic
research follows. The next section describes how the lived
experiences of the New Orleans research families illustrate
embeddedness and network ties; in particular, how well-or
insufficiently embedded networks forward or constrain the
families’ economic progress, dynamically and over time.
The concluding section addresses theoretical and practical
implications of broader incorporation of a social
embeddedness perspective, both nationally and
internationally.
Theoretical Perspectives on Disaster
Perspectives from Multiple Disciplines
Disaster scholarship’s focus on a particular part of a
disruptive “event” generally directed research and policy to
a single aspect of the phenomenon, such as persons,
institutions or the built environment. For example, although
greatly simplified here, disaster scholars from the fields of
psychology and social psychology frequently addressed
human behavior and individual well-being (Gist, Lubin, &
Red-burn, 1998; see also the first Special Issue on Katrina,
Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 6(1), 2006).
Relevant to the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation,
these scholars valuably explored developmental factors and
interventions that compounded or mediated stress (Gist et
al., 1998). They also highlighted emergent community or
neighborhood helping networks (Rodr´ıguez, Trainor, &
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Quarantelli, 2006) or identified “system justification
processes” (Napier, Mandizodza, Anderson, & Jost, 2006),
such as stereotyping and victim-blaming. Others, from
disciplines that include political science and social
psychology, extensively documented the disproportionate
suffering and disadvantage in post-Katrina New Orleans by
characteristics such as race, gender, class, and age
(Enarson, 2006; Gilman, 2006; Logan, 2006).
Another set of scholars, perhaps the largest although not
discipline specific, focused a technological, techno-political
or techno-health lens on creating and implementing
institutional or organizational strategies for disaster
preparation and recovery management (Alexander, 2006;
Donohue, Masilela, & Gear, 2000; Friedman & Relave,
2005; Kettl, 2006), including the modeling of causal chains
(Venton & Hansford, 2006). This research centered on
managerial practices and operational capacities at city,
state, and federal levels of government. In New Orleans,
this meant identifying what prevention plans had been in
place, what communications, resources, and supplies were
needed immediately after the hurricane, and later, in
microscopic detail, analysis of what went wrong where,
when and why. Still others, often from the fields of
geography or engineering, directed a spatial, geophysical
lens on nature and natural forces (Gordon, 2007; United
States Risk Management, 2007). Such lenses focused on
the built environment and land use, primarily to assess
reconstruction strategies, although some assessed the
interface of the geophysical and social as well (Cutter &
Emrich, 2006). In New Orleans, this meant analyzing ways
to strengthen the levee system and assessing which spaces
were and were not physically sound for rebuilding.
The predominant emphasis on response and recovery, and
on conceptualizing the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans
situation as a “natural disaster” and as an “event” in much
of this literature underscored Quarantelli’s (2005)
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contention that disaster research has been approached
ahistorically since the beginning of the field. In contrast,
sociological lenses on disaster have increasingly been
multifocal and multivariate (Perry, 2005; Perry &
Quarantelli, 2005).
Sociological and Related Perspectives on Disaster
Generally speaking, a sociological orientation to disaster
theory and research has emphasized the intersections and
interactions between personal lives and the socio-politicaleconomic environment in which lives were lived. In other
words, the field of disaster sociology applied theoretical
understanding about society to social phenomena and to
research-based social policies and practices in turn, as two
extremely reflective overviews of the field have shown
(Quarantelli, 2005; Tierney, 2007). As such, most disaster
sociologists, as well as sociologically oriented disaster
scholars from other disciplines, viewed a situation such as
Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans from multiple
locations and histories—often from a systems perspective,
as discussed earlier, or from a social vulnerability approach
or mix of the two (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; Cutter
2005, 2006; Cutter & Emrich, 2006; Tierney, 2006, 2007;
Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006; Wisner, 2001). The
social construction of the situation, historical lodging, and
emphasis on social structure were features of these
approaches that moved toward an embeddedness
perspective, although more implicitly than explicitly.
For example, toward the notion of constructed rather than
factual truths, Hartmann (1999) argued that, “Actors’
interpretation of disasters crucially depends on the political
and social environment in which they occur” (p. 1,
emphasis added). Similarly, Stahl, Lichtenstein, and
Mangan (2003) characterized responses to a situation such
as a hurricane as “depending on social agreements and
individual perceptions” (p. 18); in effect, as Quarantelli
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(2005) contended, as a constructed “social problem” rather
than as a “focused occasion in terms of time and space”
(p. 334). Notably, Granovetter (1992a) himself associated
constructionism with embeddedness, contending that,
“economic institutions do not emerge automatically in
response to economic needs; rather, they are constructed by
individuals whose action is both facilitated and constrained
by the structure and resources available in social networks
in which they are embedded” (p. 7). Given the importance
of language to constructionism, Stallings (2005)
characterized what others call a “disaster,” a “social
situation,” which this article has amended to “disaster
situation.”
Regarding historical lodging, a collection of
multidisciplinary scholars’ responses to Hurricane Katrina
in a recent volume edited by Hartman and Squires (2006)
fully acknowledged the role of the past in creating the
conditions for disaster in New Orleans, via both systems
and social vulnerability perspectives. These contributions
implied, but did not explicitly identify that poor health,
housing, environmental, education, labor market, and
employment conditions were embedded in the economic
and social action of human and institutional actors in preKatrina New Orleans.
Similarly, a volume of recent sociological contributions,
edited by Brunsma, Overfelt, and Picou (2007), actively
redressed Quarantelli’s (2005) concern about the ahistorical
nature of disaster research. However, as Tierney (2007)
contended elsewhere about the field in general, Clarke
(2007) charged that current disaster literature, including the
Brunsma et al. volume, has concentrated mostly on what
happened during and immediately after Katrina, rather than
on what happened before the storm and what will happen in
the future (p. 237). As such, he concluded that, “we need a
lot more attention on what creates the conditions that lead
to calamity in the first place” (p. 237). Along these lines,
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while the contributions in the Brunsma et al. volume did
not explicitly conceptualize disaster situations as
embedded, Barnshaw and Trainor’s (2007) chapter focused
on “the process of social capital conversion/ transformation
into resources [during disasters]” (p. 95) ...which
“highlights the form and operation of the networks within
which resources are embedded” (p. 96). As such, Barnshaw
and Trainor moved firmly toward the embeddedness
perspective discussed in this article, even though their
chapter still evidenced a lingering systems orientation
whereby individuals, social structures, and social
institutions were located on intersecting rather than
mutually constitutive paths.
Along structural lines, Quarantelli (2005) contended that
“disasters are inherently social phenomena and that the
source of disasters is rooted in the social structure or social
system” (p. 339). Extending Quarantelli’s view, Hilhorst’s
(2003) “mutuality paradigm” looked at the mutual
constitution of society and environment (p. 2). Other
sociologists took a structural social vulnerability approach
to disaster research, emphasizing, as have some
anthropologists and geographers, “the social creation of
vulnerability” (Oliver-Smith, 1996, p. 314). Kroll-Smith
(2001) argued for a “vulnerability analysis,” which by
definition implied different levels of risk (Smith, 2006),
holding that, “disasters are always more than physical
catastrophes with social consequences; they are also the
outcome of a complex and long-running interplay of power
and geography that works to shield some people from the
whims of nature or the negligence of dangerous industries
while exposing others to the unwanted fallout of these acts
of nature and man” (Kroll-Smith, p. 175). Similarly,
Erikson (2006) contended that while we have become more
adept at technological measurement of hurricanes, we are
not good at “calculating the levels of the vulnerability of
the human, social and environmental landscapes that
disasters strike” (p. 7). He called for the development of a
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vulnerability index, which, by then, had been created by
sociologically oriented cultural geographers (Cutter, 2005;
Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003) and called the Social
Vulnerability Index (SoVI). When Cutter and colleagues
(2003) developed the SoVI, they worked from the partsystems, part-embeddedness premise that “social
vulnerability is partially the product of social inequalities
.... however, it also includes place inequalities—those
characteristics of communities and the built environment,
such as the level of urbanization, growth rates, and
economic vitality, that contribute to
[i.e. constitute] the social vulnerability of places” (p. 243).
In a sense, the index’s continuous and dynamic association
of an area’s social, political and economic hazards with the
area’s vulnerability to a disaster situation implied the
notion of embeddedness and its constitutive structural
influences.
Similarly, Tierney’s (2007) emphasis on the inherent
lodging of disaster situations in community life, and on the
“need for strengthening community resilience, building
public-private partnerships, reaching out to marginalized
community residents and their trusted institutions, and
developing consensus-based coordinating mechanisms at
the interorganizational, community, and intergovernmental
levels” (Tierney et al., 2006, p. 76), approached the idea of
embeddedness in its focus on the need for participatory,
multimodal, and networked planning. Finally,
anthropologists Breunlin and Regis (2006) made brief
mention of embeddedness and network ties in their analysis
of the Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation,
demonstrating that both concepts are well-suited for
multidisciplinary examination.
In sum, these sociological and related disciplinary positions
on disaster situations not only valuably posited a systemic
interrelatedness of persons, organizations and institutions,
but some also moved toward the notion that economic and
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social actions are embedded in—that is, are constitutive
of—an urban environment’s structures, policies and
practices. This embeddedness perspective is amplified next.
Embeddedness and Network Ties
Although Polanyi (2001/1944) and Weber (1978/1922),
respectively, mentioned or implied the concept of
embeddedness, Granovetter (1985) produced the seminal
formulation of the concept, which he initially described as,
“the extent to which economic action [behavior] is
embedded in structures of social relations” (p. 481), and
later (1992a) as, “the embeddedness of economic goals and
activities in socially oriented goals and structures” (p. 3).
Most recently, Granovetter described embeddedness as,
“the way social and economic activities are mixed up with
networks of social relations” (Krippner, Granovetter,
Block, Biggart, & Beamish, 2004, p. 113). Swedberg
(2003) contended similarly that “an economic action is in
principle always ‘embedded’ in some form or another of
social structure” (p. 28). On both views, “structures” are
positions created by the distribution of the relational ties
between actors (Schweizer, 1997, p. 751) and are “a result
of rules and resources that exist in and through the
activities of human agents” (Miller & Rivera, 2007, p.
144). In other words, as Coleman (1990) put it,
“Granovetter’s notion of embeddedness may be seen as an
attempt to introduce into the analysis of economic systems
social and organizational relations” (p. 302).
Indeed, Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) earlier work on
network ties formed a constitutive part of his
embeddedness theory, in that networks, and thus economically embedded social actions, result either from “strong”
ties, which generally signify intensive but narrowly
bounded relationships and opportunities, or from “weak”
ties, whereby a broader range of information and
opportunities inhere to more distant relationships or
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contacts. Illustrating this from the perspective of the job
seeker, strong ties might consist of neighbors and/or social
groups that would be likely to provide overlapping and thus
limited information about job possibilities, whereas weak
ties, such as staff in job training or workforce organizations
or persons whose networks radiate out to multiple distant
contact points, potentially provide a new and expanded
landscape of job possibilities.
Further, economic sociologists have recently extended
Granovetter’s tie concept through attention to the content or
quality of the ties as well as to the structures formed by the
ties (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007): in particular, the
emotional valence in, level of trust fostered by, and quality
of information transferred through the tie relationship.
Zelizer (2002) also extended Granovetter’s tie concept,
holding that people differentiate among particular kinds of
interpersonal relations, which in turn form different
practices, rights and obligations, or “differentiated” ties.
Similarly, Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs (2000) extended
Granovetter’s work on social network resources with the
question, “how do individuals, in response to a particular
event, choose to activate particular sectors of the multiple
networks in which they are embedded” (p. 599). These
extensions mean that a weak tie, such as an organization in
a workforce intermediary’s network, needs its staff to
develop personal relationships with the job seeker or with
another organization’s staff, needs to provide consistent
service in order to be perceived as trustworthy, and needs
to offer high-quality and differentiated contacts to be an
effective choice for the job seeker or organization.
Equally important, although Granovetter’s network tie
concept has been characterized as the same as “social
capital,” the two concepts are both similar and different.
Although both concern economic phenomena and both
“inhere in the structure of relations within which purposive
action takes place” (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993, p.
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1322), social capital relationships are more commonly
dyadic and linear, whereas network ties are more likely to
be multiple and concurrent. In addition, early theorizing
about social capital presented it as solely positive, whereas
some later versions and most conceptualizations of network
ties identify the potential for both positive and negative
valences and outcomes. Following Granovetter, the concept
of network ties rather than social capital is used in this
article.
In all, Granovetter tried to show theoretically that economic
behavior involved more than rational choices by atomized,
independent actors. On his view, economic action and
decision-making occurred through, as Lazer (2006) put it,
“relational ties and one’s structural position in a network of
personal contacts” (p. 1). As a result, Granovetter’s
conception of embeddedness has generally been applied at
micro and meso levels; that is, at individuals and
organizations as they “mediate the effects of macroscopic
processes” (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990, p. 3). The
exploration and discussion in this article follows in that
direction.
Importantly, while Granovetter’s (1985) formulation of
embeddedness is considered seminal, it is not without
critique, which has charged incomplete development of the
concept at the macro or market/economy level (Barber,
1995; Krippner & Alvarez, 2007), the ambiguity, varied
uses, and often insufficient specification of the term
(Moody & White, 2003; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993),
and its exclusive reliance on networks (Swedberg, 1997).
As the exploration in this article directly concerns micro
and meso rather than macro levels, that aspect of the
critique may be less relevant. Regarding ambiguity,
however, in this article we strive for specificity and
consistency in our use of the term. Arguably, the recent
extensions to embeddedness theory noted earlier have
deepened its potential relevance to the Hurricane Katrina–
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New Orleans situation, as will be illustrated in the family
experiences which follow the brief discussion of research
procedures and pre-Katrina New Orleans next.
Empirical and Spatial Context of the Ethnographic
Research in New Orleans
Research Procedures
Between 1998 and 2003, the principal investigator (first
author) and her team of eight local researchers, which
included the second author, conducted ethnographic
research in five U.S. cities—one of which was New
Orleans. In order to better understand the mobility efforts
of low-income families (commonly called “the working
poor”) under economically challenging urban conditions,
the team identified a set of “key parents” who had
participated in job training programs affiliated with a
national workforce demonstration program and followed
them for up to five years (see Iversen & Armstrong, 2006,
for complete description of research methods). In each city,
a designated workforce intermediary organization (Giloth,
2004) strove to develop seamless networks of employmentrelated education, training and service organizations,
policymakers, and community members to foster the
economic well-being of families and communities. The
New Orleans workforce intermediary also conducted a
four-week pre-employment program, which the study
participants attended.
Using formal and informal interviews and observation in
the families’ natural settings (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), the
team spent time in the families’ homes, neighborhoods and
extended family networks, and also in the parents’ job
training sites, community organizations, firms and
children’s schools. The research design overall was similar
to Duneier’s (1999) extended place method, Marcus’s
(1998) multisited ethnography, and Burawoy’s (2003)
reflexive ethnography. In the explicit attempt to link micro
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with macro processes (Burawoy et al., 2000; Willis, 2000),
these methods of inquiry begin with a core place or person
and fan out organically to those in contact with, mentioned
by, and relevant to the core per-son(s) along the dimension
of interest. “Fanning out” enabled us to contact over 1,000
auxiliary persons and organizations associated with the
families in the five cities—around 200 in New Orleans
alone.
The audiotaped and transcribed material was analyzed
qualitatively by multiple analysts, first through the creation
of computer-assisted coded themes and then through the
construction of individual family stories according to a
diachronic narrative approach (Ostrander, 1995), or telling
a story through time. Demographic data on the key parents
from training program administrative records (Hebert et al.,
2002) was compared quantitatively with the same data
collected on the other 4,000 workforce demonstration
participants who found jobs after their training program.
Parent characteristics were also compared with those of
recipients of Unemployment Insurance (Needels, Corson,
& Nicholson, 2001) and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2001), which became the safety net programs after the
welfare reform legislation of 1996. These comparisons
suggested that the study sample was substantively similar
to millions of low-earning families across the United
States.
Although the original ethnographic research formally ended
in mid-2003, the authors spent a week in New Orleans in
February 2006 to explore what might lie ahead for the
research families if they were to return to the city. We
conducted observations and interviews with former and
new research participants, some of which continued
periodically thereafter. While the original research was
loosely guided by a systems perspective on the
interrelationships between persons/ families and
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organizations, reanalysis of what the workforce
intermediary network meant and resulted in for the job
training participants and their families suggested that
network ties were a critical aspect of their mobility process,
for good and ill. Alternative explanations cannot be fully
ruled out, however. For example, some scholars working in
an embeddedness tradition in anthropology have conceptualized systems and subsystems as “sets of embedded
networks” (Wolfe, as cited in Schweizer, 1997, p. 775),
rather than as different ways to conceptualize social action,
as this article does. That said, triangulation of researchers,
respondents, and analysts, which included families’ review
of their narratives, or what Burawoy (2003) called
“valedictory revisiting,” increased the authenticity of the
findings and credibility of the interpretations (Padgett,
2008).
Pre-Katrina New Orleans 1
The spatial context for examining a sociological
embeddedness perspective on a disaster situation concerns
the economic environment for the research families and
thousands like them in New Orleans before as well as after
Hurricane Katrina. Regarding its workforce, the city of
New Orleans had lost 18% of its population between 1970
and 2000 (Muro et al., 2005, p. 4), and an additional 1%
between 2000 and July 2005 (Liu & Plyer, 2008, p. 11).
Regarding job opportunities, New Orleans’s share of
metropolitan area jobs had dropped from 66% in 1970 to
42% in 2000, and the remaining jobs shifted from the
higher-wage manufacturing sector to the lower-wage
service and retail sectors (Muro et al., 2005). Nearly 87%
of the jobs for all New Orleanians were in the service
1

All data about New Orleans in the paper pertain to Orleans Parish
alone, and not to the New Orleans metropolitan region, which includes
parishes less harmed by the Hurricane Katrina situation. Orleans Parish
and the city of New Orleans are the same demographic and geographic
entity.
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sector, and in 2003 the average annual pay in half of those
jobs fell below the national average (Muro et al., 2005).
Even in the few higher-paying industries in New Orleans,
wage levels were not robust. The national average weekly
wage in private industry in 2000 was $648, which was
13.1% higher than the comparable wage in New Orleans
(Dolfman, Wasser, & Bergman, 2007, p. 5). More
generally, a long history of inadequate public transportation
(Taylor, 1984), especially outside the tourist areas, plus a
weak educational system that Plaisance (2006)
characterized as “one of the nation’s worst,” not only
limited access to existing jobs but also discouraged
industrial development. The families’ employment efforts
were thus embedded in a shrinking economic context, as
their lived experiences suggest.
An Embeddedness Perspective and Families’ Lived
Experience
Narrative material 2 from the New Orleans families seemed
to illustrate how the network aspects of embeddedness
theory—network structures and network ties, as evidenced
particularly in the form of the workforce intermediary and
its relational network—constituted the pre-Katrina
economic conditions in New Orleans in which the families’
post-Katrina economic potential is embedded.
These examples are only three of many.
Elizabeth Seabrook
Thirty-seven-year-old Elizabeth Seabrook had been
employed as a certified nursing assistant for many years,
2

All person names are pseudonyms chosen by the families.
Pseudonyms for auxiliary persons and organizations were chosen by
the authors.
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but found over time that she couldn’t support her two
preschool-aged children on that income and thus sought a
more financially and personally rewarding career. In 2000,
she enrolled in the New Orleans workforce intermediary’s
pre-employment program, whose administrators had developed and nurtured network ties with a local community
college, which enabled Elizabeth to enroll in the college’s
medical technology training program. Despite the welldeveloped community college ties, the network might have
better facilitated Elizabeth’s success if it had also fostered
ties with secondary education institutions.
Indeed, the medical technology program was designed to
be 18 months long, but even before the storm, Elizabeth
had been a full-time student for over three years. In 2002, a
college administrator told the research team that Elizabeth
was required to enroll in mostly remedial subjects, in part
because the high school education she received in New
Orleans public schools had been substandard in quality.
Illustrating this, at least 41% of fourth-graders and at least
59% of eighth-graders in New Orleans failed the
standardized Louisiana Educational Assessment Program
[LEAP] test in 2002–2003 (Nelson, 2003). Although
remedial courses are prevalent among community college
students across the United States (Schemo, 2006), the
inadequacy of Elizabeth’s earlier schooling, despite the fact
that she’d earned excellent high school grades, severely
constrained her progress. The other constraint on Elizabeth,
and on prior training program graduates in the medical
program, was the problem of incomplete information
exchange in the college-intermediary network, as the
college administrator described:
The pre-employment program graduates at the Community College
campus are typically not ‘college literate.’ I don’t think the problems
arose entirely out of academic incompetence. In fact, the [intermediary]
program grads generally matched the college norm in terms of
background and testing ability. Most students were in college for the
first time and 80% of those in health areas began in remedial
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coursework for at least one subject. I feel that the problems are more
systemic, mainly concerning communication breakdowns in the areas
of recruitment and admissions. And in my opinion, the program staff
lack a working knowledge of the college’s regimented testing
procedures, which also caused stumbling blocks. Community College
administrator, fall 2002

In addition, education policy in the early 2000s was not
attuned to students like Elizabeth. In order to be eligible for
the total allotment of federal education funding for training
like the medical technology program, the student must
attend school full time. However, Elizabeth often held three
jobs simultaneously in order to support her family, which
left little time for the amount of studying required of a fulltime student. Thus, Elizabeth not only had to take remedial
courses, she had to repeat courses that she failed because
she didn’t have enough time or energy to study. One of
Elizabeth’s more desperate strategies to succeed against
such odds was to listen to lesson tapes through headphones
while she slept. To compensate for such challenges, some
intermediaries in other cities used their network
relationships to embed on-site mentoring of students or new
workers in their vocational institutions or businesses, which
increased the level of trust and quality of information
exchanged. However, this action was absent in the New
Orleans network, as an intermediary administrator
lamented:
The Community College’s curriculum requirements were problematic.
At the pre-employment program, we originally expected that the
college would cater to program graduates. However, the requirements
of licensure state certification and exams proved to be too cumbersome
for an established and relatively entrenched institution, and as a result
the college was unable to accommodate program grads by customizing
their programs. Consequently, our students were unable to register for
technical courses, and as a result upwards of 60 percent were dropping
out. Intermediary administrator, winter 2002

Elizabeth’s intermediary’s network would also have been
strengthened by more robust ties to subsidized, quality

20

child-care facilities. In Elizabeth’s experience, center-based
care was either affordable but poor quality (in one site, her
children were never allowed outside) or higher quality but
unaffordable. Thus, in order to meet the multiple demands

Fig. 1. Grounds of Elizabeth Seabrook’s mother’s senior care housing
facility, February 2006.

of work, school, and parenting, Elizabeth depended
extensively on her aging, chronically ill mother for beforeand after-school help with the children. Although postKatrina child-care assistance has been characterized as
more flexible and accessible than earlier (Louisiana
Department of Social Services, 2008), a workforce network
would need to ensure that sufficient slots were available for
returning families. As of April 2008, only about two in five
(41%) of former child-care facilities in Orleans Parish had
reopened (Liu & Plyer, 2008, p. 50).
Three years post-Katrina, we still don’t know where
Elizabeth, her children or her mother are, or how they are
faring. Chronically ill elderly persons in senior care
facilities, such as Elizabeth’s mother, seemed forgotten
both during and after Katrina, as the abandoned wheelchair
in front of the mother’s abandoned facility portrays (Figure
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1). We do know, however, the Elizabeth and her family
were embedded in a deeply inadequate economic
infrastructure in New Orleans long before the hurricane,
and that despite its aims and community college ties, the
network at that time was not sufficiently developed to
compensate for the missing ties. While Elizabeth’s network
situation lacked education and child-care coherence, Rachel
Quinn’s lacked employment attunement.
Rachel Quinn
At age 40, after two-plus years of post-secondary
education, no degree, and a series of short-term jobs,
Rachel Quinn enrolled in construction training to improve
her career path and try to move her family out of public
housing. She had already enhanced her two teenaged
children’s futures by navigating their enrollment in
specialized high schools far from the family’s high-poverty
neighborhood because their neighborhood high school was
rated “unacceptable” by state standards (Louisiana
Department of Education, 2001). In spring 2006, as Rachel
reported from her displacement city on the East Coast, her
son was in college and her daughter was advancing in
military service.
Earlier, after completing the workforce intermediary’s fourweek pre-employment program, Rachel was hired by a
construction labor union that was part of the intermediary’s
network, and “on paper” she earned a family-sustaining
income. However, Rachel was channeled into event
carpentry rather than residential or commercial carpentry,
which meant that she constructed temporary displays and
booths for conventions, conferences, and large product
shows. Even before the hurricane, there wasn’t enough
business to keep all the event carpenters fully employed, as
Rachel’s supervisor related:
Only about one hundred of the two hundred and fifty to three hundred union
members at trade show sites work a full forty-hour work week. Rachel Quinn’s
construction union supervisor, 2003.
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Consistent with the supervisor’s comments, although
Rachel technically held a full-time job, she was only
assigned part-time work. This also meant that her projected
annual income of $28,204 only resulted in about $6,000.
Moreover, the potential work environment for Rachel in
post-Katrina New Orleans reflected its embeddedness in
the state of the industry before Katrina. Six months after
the storm, Rachel’s former supervisor described the
debilitated construction market for locals:
Some carpentry work is available for residential facilities, but there
isn’t any yet for commercial facilities. This is partly because very few
journeymen have returned to the city and electrical outages are
continual ...In addition, the Hispanics came and got all the early
construction work. Rachel Quinn’s construction union supervisor,
February 2006

The supervisor’s final comment was, in fact, an accurate
reflection of the early post-Katrina demography in New
Orleans, as Maruyama and Ruscher (2006) reported:
“Approximately half of the reconstruction workforce in
Orleans metropolitan area is Latino, and approximately half
of these individuals are undocumented workers. The vast
majority (87%) relocated from another location elsewhere
in the United States where they had lived prior to Katrina”
(p. 257). Two years after Katrina, the demographic shift to
a higher proportion Hispanic and a lower proportion
African American persisted (Plyer, 2007). Thus, because
trade show construction was so limited, if Rachel returned
to New Orleans, she would have to remain in public
housing—if it were available.
In reality, even before Katrina, Housing Authority of New
Orleans (HANO) officials had discussed converting
Rachel’s development into mixed-income
housing, which is a trend seen nationally (Ouroussoff,
2006). An earlier public redevelopment project in New
Orleans resulted in about 25% low-income units and 75%
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market-rate units, which meant that only about 70 of the
800 low-income families who previously lived there, fewer
than one in 10, were able or eligible to return (Kamenetz,
2005). Although a grass-roots coalition of former residents
and New Orleans advocates actively contested the city’s
public housing demolition and rebuilding plans (Cacibauda,
2007), and Rachel’s development was part of the
intermediary’s network, both sets of relationships consisted
of strong rather than weak ties, which meant they were
constrained in their impact on broader housing conditions.
In fact, as the barbed wire fence in the 2006 photo
portended (Figure 2), demolition of Rachel’s former
development began in December 2007 (Ouroussoff, 2007),
adding to the 60% reduction in the city’s public housing
stock (Lehrer, 2008). Thus, while the intermediary’s weak

Fig. 2. Rachel Quinn’s public housing development, February 2006.
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tie to the construction union facilitated Rachel’s original
employment, the quality of the tie and of her job was
inadequate. As a result, Rachel was unable to move
forward economically or out of public housing pre-Katrina,
and now both mobility avenues seem closed. Last, Joseph
Faithful experienced an inadequate weak-tie network,
which he replaced with a strong-tie network that seemed
beneficial for the short run, but limited for the long run.
Joseph Faithful
In the early 2000s, Joseph Faithful’s family’s church took
on an “informal” intermediary role in joining families, skill
training, and jobs in a seamless network of strong ties. In
this case, strong ties seemed surprisingly beneficial, much
as they have been for many immigrant enclaves (Portes &
Sensenbrenner, 1993), likely because the marginalized
position of both Joseph and immigrant groups meant that
weaker ties were less readily available to them.
Alternatively, the benefits of the strong ties were illusory.
Joseph was a 23-year-old high school graduate and a
married father of two infant children. He had earlier, and
passionately, pursued a construction career through the
New Orleans workforce intermediary’s construction
apprenticeship program, but the program lacked reciprocity
with the intermediary such that Joseph’s only assignment in
the first days of the apprenticeship was to pick up trash.
Holding that he “did not go to all this training and take two
[unpaid] months out of my life so that I could go pick up
trash,” Joseph left the apprenticeship for a job outside the
construction field in order to support his family, and
severed his relationship with the intermediary and its
network. In response to this particular event, as Hurlbert,
Haines, and Beggs (2000) would have described, Joseph
activated the family’s church as his “official” workforce
network.
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As a strong tie, the church offered emotional and
instrumental support for Joseph’s work efforts.
Emotionally, the church was “family,” as both Joseph and
his wife were partially estranged from their families of
origin. Instrumentally, because the church served as the
umbrella for an informal construction business, Joseph
found construction employment and mentoring with
George, a trusted church colleague who was a selfemployed contractor. While Joseph’s income arrangement
with George was under-the-table, raising the question of
whether staying with the construction apprenticeship might
have been more economically productive, Joseph valued
the encouragement and breadth of experience he gained
under George’s tutelage. Still, had Joseph remained in the
workforce network’s apprenticeship and moved up in union
ranks, weak ties to the industry’s multi-state resources
might have benefited him during displacement after the
hurricane.
Alternatively, the fact that the church operated satellites in
several different parts of New Orleans meant that it could
potentially remain a useful intermediary after Hurricane
Katrina—at least to the extent that the church’s network as
a whole remained functional. Although, to our knowledge,

Fig. 3. Joseph Faithful’s former living room, Lower Ninth Ward,
February 2006.
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by spring 2006, Joseph and his family had not returned to
New Orleans, the local researcher reported that the church
had set up residential construction work in one of its lessdamaged satellites such that it continued to be a source of
economic and social support for its remaining parishioners.
Other than this hub, however, as Rachel Quinn’s supervisor
had reported, residential construction work in post-Katrina
New Orleans was rare.
Moreover, the house in the Lower Ninth Ward that George
owned and rented to Joseph and his family before Katrina
was completely demolished by the storm, as the picture of
the former living room shows (Figure 3). Thus the
constricted opportunity for Joseph Faithful in today’s New
Orleans seemed to reflect that sole reliance on strong ties
might not have been the most economically productive
pathway for him in the long run.
Furthering a Sociological Embeddedness Perspective
for Disaster Research and Policy
The narratives of Elizabeth, Rachel, Joseph, and a few of
the 200 auxiliary contacts from our ethnographic research
in New Orleans, suggest that even before Hurricane
Katrina, the economic environment in the city only
minimally supported the productivity of families headed by
lower earners. The limited economic (i.e., educational,
housing, employment, and work support policy)
infrastructure in which these families had been embedded
for decades was surely worsened but not caused by Katrina.
Nevertheless, the focus of most public discourse and social
action after Katrina has been on remedies to particular
technological, geophysical or political aspects, such as
communications systems, levee reconstruction, or
government disaster planning and responses.
This contrast between constitutive and particularistic
orientations to the social milieu reminds us that
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conceptualizing and defining a phenomenon is far more
than linguistic, as Perry (2005) and Quarantelli (2005,
2006) contended as well. Conceptualizing the Hurricane
Katrina–New Orleans situation as “natural” or as an
anomalous “event” has obscured the fact that it is equally
viable to conceptualize such a disaster situation as
embedded economic choices over time and throughout a
society. As the empirical examples from the pre-and postKatrina ethnography suggest, a sociological embeddedness
perspective on disaster situations seems highly congruent
with families’ lived experience; in particular, the obvious
and dynamic seamlessness of past, present and future
economic contexts and social actions.
As such, a more intensive and extensive incorporation of
the sociological concepts of embeddedness (Granovetter,
1985; Krippner et al., 2004) and “weak,” “strong,” and
“differentiated” network ties (Granovetter, 1973; Hurlbert,
Beggs, & Haines, 2006; Zelizer, 2002), may provide a
generative direction for theory building among disaster
scholars as they harness and expand upon many rich
contributions from multiple disciplines. In particular,
Elizabeth’s, Rachel’s, and Joseph’s very typical stories
about trying to move ahead through training and better jobs
underscore that the strength, content, and quality of
different ties are all critical components of an effective
workforce network. Accordingly, attention needs to be paid
not only to which network ties are activated, but also to
how they are cultivated in the social environment over
time.
At base, an embeddedness perspective converts the macro
and micro from binaries to the notion of a fluid and
dynamic continuum of social actions, which, in addition to
guiding theory, provides openings for more inclusive social
planning and policy directions. Illustrating a similar step,
Trigilia (2007) stressed that a network of relations between
individuals and a network of relations between
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organizations or collective actors are both important: “A
good network of relations between interest organizations,
financial institutions, universities and local governments [in
effect, ‘weak’ ties] can favor the improvement of
infrastructural facilities and the efficient provision of
economic and social services, as well as ...the establishment
of effective cooperation between economic actors and
research and training institutions” (p. 69). Planning, policy,
and research implications of an embeddedness perspective
for post-Katrina New Orleans follow along similar lines.
Beginning with neighborhood and community planning for
New Orleans, network tie concepts might be usefully
incorporated into an existing risk assessment protocol such
as the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) (Cutter et al.,
2003; Cutter & Emrich, 2006), which reveals spatial as
well as temporal differences in social vulnerability
according to a broad set of demographic and environmental
actions and actors. Used ground-up by community
networks coordinated by workforce intermediaries (Giloth,
2004) or by faith-based intermediaries (Holcombe, 2007),
versus solely top-down, which as anthropologists Breunlin
and Regis (2006) described, “disproportionately impact
black and low-income communities in New Orleans” (p.
744), an enhanced SoVI assessment might help Elizabeth,
Rachel, Joseph and others like them to identify the unique
roles and resources that each type of tie relationship in or
available to their network could contribute to strengthening
their general, everyday lives. At the same time, developing
different network ties could strengthen and enhance
individual and organizational hurricane evacuation
decisions, dislocation responses, or recovery strategies. As
one example, illustrated in both Rachel’s and Joseph’s
narratives, pre-Katrina assessment of the structure and
quality of their tie relationships could have identified what
emotional and instrumental support networks were
available as well as what disadvantages might inhere to
exclusive reliance on them. Post-Katrina and for the future
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more generally, an enhanced SoVI or similar assessment
could help Joseph identify and engage additional weak tie
relationships, such as potentially fruitful employment,
housing or relocation contacts and resources. Similar
assessment could help Rachel build a network of weak tie
relationships that might buffer and provide alternatives to
her conflicting work and housing contexts.
More broadly, assessment of network ties through an
enhanced vulnerability protocol could be aimed at more
inclusive and potentially more effective infrastructure
planning in New Orleans—what traditional disaster
scholars call “strengthening,” both for preventive
mitigation of disaster effects and for increased resilience in
recovery and to establish a stronger economy for the future
(Berke & Campanella, 2006; McEntire, Fuller, Johnston, &
Weber, 2002). Such planning could engage community
members in natural neighborhood groups such as
community centers, faith organizations, or workforce
intermediaries with broader organizational and institutional
networks, and lead to more participatory decisions and
actions that would be actively sustained over time.
Organizing networks around such localized groups has a
good chance of being effective in New Orleans because of
the city’s long tradition of ward and neighborhood
identification. For example, Capowich and Kondkar (2007)
reported that after a series of neighborhood planning
meetings about rebuilding New Orleans neighborhoods
took place, the process of combining these plans into
district-level project proposals had begun (p. 185).
“Maximum participation by the entire community”
(Costanza et al., 2006, p. 319) has been viewed by many as
critical for the viable future of New Orleans, as this and
other research (Ethridge, 2006; Hartman & Squires, 2006)
contend as well. In other words, “the focus should be on
local preferences and local knowledge” (Kiesling & Irons,
2005, p. 3), with all their inherent and potentially
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generative differences, and explicitly not on a uniform,
one-size-fits-all design.
Another benefit of a neighborhood/community-based SoVI
extension is that regardless of the divisions that exist in a
locale by class, race, risk (Beck, 2006) and the like, as
Elliott and Pais (2006) reported, “people respond to
disasters not as isolated individuals but as members of
overlapping forms of social affiliation, which interpret,
affirm and support particular definitions and responses to
the situation” (p. 300), or as Breunlin and Regis (2006) put
it, the role of people [i.e. through network ties] “is as a
platform for reproducing life in the city” (p. 761). Thus, an
extended SoVI-type assessment could be made relevant to
residents of all economic strata, as well as to the varied
organizations with which they are or could be involved.
In the policy domain, community-generated knowledge
might lead to policies that are guided by a multifaceted,
multilevel vision of economically embedded social action.
The crafting of integrated health, housing and employment
support policies, among others, could actualize such a
vision. As a small example, the recent increase in the
maximum Pell grant (Schemo, 2007) was a policy direction
that could help family heads like Elizabeth Seabrook meet
the intersecting and competing demands of education, work
and family life, not only before, but also during and after a
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans situation. Thinking of
education, job training, employment, and policy, for
example, as embedded in families’ economic actions might
help to break down and ultimately eliminate some of the
bureaucratic organizational boundaries that have
constrained mobility for families like those in this research,
and more generally, that have perpetuated stratification and
class division.
In terms of scholarly inquiry, further theoretically based
research could enhance knowledge building about
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embeddedness and disaster situations, generally and
specifically for New Orleans. For example, because the
exploration and resultant theorizing about embeddedness in
this article derived in part from reanalysis of existing
empirical material, a next step would be to use an
embeddedness network perspective in the design of original
field research (Schweizer, 1997). Schweizer called
particularly for longitudinal examination of network studies
of social organizations (p. 756), which would certainly
include intermediary networks, and by definition, network
assessment would involve human and organizational or
institutional actors. As such, longitudinal research on the
enhanced social vulnerability protocol suggested earlier
could reveal prospectively how differently each of the New
Orleans families in this research might fare during a
situation involving a hurricane, as well as what networked
personal, policy and organizational ties each would need in
order to construct new economic futures thereafter.
Future research could also valuably pursue the relevance of
embeddedness and network concepts in other parts of the
world that experience disaster situations similar to
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans. For example, Caporale’s
(2000) study of rainstorm-related landslides in Italy in 1998
and Donohue, Masileia, and Gears’ (2000) report about
flood devastation in South Africa in 2000 revealed
important parallels to the continuing danger in New
Orleans from the inadequate preventive and responsive
measures provided by all levels of government. Crosscultural knowledge building, as disaster anthropology has
valuably shown (Oliver-Smith, 1996), is a potentially rich
learning and planning strategy. As evidence, Wisner (2001)
reported that community-based social vulnerability
assessments have emerged in countries outside the United
States, whereby “the community defines its own
vulnerabilities and capabilities; outsiders don’t” (p. 5).
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More broadly, varied conceptual approaches to disaster
situations, such as systems, social vulnerabliity, and
embeddedness, could be compared within the United States
and across cultural domains, without losing sight of what is
sociologically useful (Stallings, 2002, p. 284). In this case,
additional examples and deeper understanding of the
economic embeddedness of disaster situations such as
Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans would be sociologically
useful. For example, because application of the findings
and perspective in this article are limited to the Hurricane
Katrina–New Orleans situation, broader inquiry could
potentially ascertain whether the current findings are
relevant to other types of disaster situations or to similar
types of disaster situations in other geographic and cultural
milieus. Ultimately, research and planning deriving from a
sociological embeddedness perspective on disaster
situations such as Hurricane Katrina–New Orleans seem to
constitute both an essential step toward greater societal
economic well-being and an ongoing charge to those trying
to build a more just, inclusive world.
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